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Summary.-A framework is developed to take explicitly into account the conflicting
demands of ethics and scientific rigor in the design of clinical trials. The framework
recognizes the part played by the clinical-scientific community in the weighing of a
new result provided by a clinical trial. To illustrate the usefulness of the framework,
a value system is adopted which gives relatively high weight to ethical considera-
tions. The analysis based on this value system reveals some limitations ofthe present
clinical-trials mechanism, especially if success is defined exclusively in terms of
cure, and other dimensions of the health system, such as explanatory, care, cost or
prevention variables are neglected. On the basis of this analysis, it is suggested that:
(a) If randomized clinical trials are to be ethically acceptable, they will necessarily
yield a large proportion of null results.
(b) Positive results from ethically acceptable clinical trials would be expected to
have less impact than null results; unless this is the case, there will be a tendency to
encourage false hopes.
(c) Trials need not yield entirely null results, provided that attention is not focused
exclusively on a single outcome variable.
A trial of chemotherapy for acute myeloid leukaemia in adults is used to illustrate
the need for new approaches to the planning and design of clinical trials.
THE LONG-TERM GOAL of clinical re-
search in oncology has been summarized
as "100% survival; 0% complications"
(D'Angio et al., 1978) and the collaborative
clinical-trials mechanism has been widely
accepted as an appropriate way to move
towards it (Peto et al., 1976, 1977;
Flamant, 1972). This long-term goal
represents an ideal situation, where no
trade-offs between survival and complica-
tions are necessary. In reality, trade-offs
are almost always unavoidable, and must
be taken into account. The objective of
this paper is to explore one possible
approach to this problem, with particular
emphasis on conflicting demands of ethics
and scientific rigor in relation to collabora-
tive clinical trials.
The ethical considerations involved in
randomized clinical trials have been
widely discussed (see, for example, Mike
& Good, 1977; Peto et al., 1976; Flamant,
1972). The trade-off between ethical con-
siderations and scientific rigor can be
summarized as follows:
If randomization is part of the design,
there is a risk that some patients involved
in the trial will be deprived of a superior
therapy. On the other hand, ifrandomiza-
tion is not part ofthe design, there is a risk
that the trial will yield no scientifically
valid conclusions. This particular trade-
off, as well as others, has been made in the
absence of a conceptual framework within
which any conflict between ethics and
scientific rigor might be explicitly taken
into account. Our purpose is to propose
one such framework, and to use it to show
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that an expected conisequence ofthe trade-
off is to introduce inefficiency into the
clinical trials mechanism. Because of the
conflicting demands of ethics and scien-
tific rigor, most clinical trials would be
expected to yield "null" results. Even
where positive results are obtained, these
conflicting demands would be expected to
delay their implementation. However,
although the framework involves several
simplifying assumptions, it still indicates
possible avenues for improvement of the
clinical-trials mechanism, within the con-
straints imposed by the trade-off.
MODEL
Levels ofplanningy and evaluation
A key aspect of our model of the clinical-
trials mechanism is that it involves a dis-
tinction between at least 2 levels at which
trials should be planned and interpreted.
The first level is that of the individual re-
search team; the seconid level is that of the
clinical-scientific community (or, perhaps
more realistically, that portion ofthe clinical-
scientific community which plays a major
role in evaluating the credibility of results
obtained by individual research teams). This
distinction betwTeen 2 levels of planning
and evaluation is already recognized in
practice, and operates in the relationship
bet-ween research groups and granting agen-
cies. However, it is not a distinction that has
been formally and explicitly made when
clinical trials are planned or evaluated.
In considering these 2 levels of planning
and evaluation, it is necessary to recognize
that concepts such as uncertainty and proba-
bility have somewhat different meanings and
roles at the 2 levels. The uncertainty that
affects the work of a research team and limits
the validity of its conclusions is caused by
departures from a strictly defined experi-
mental situation, due to individual variation,
measurement errors, etc. These departures,
hopefully small, can in most cases be modelled
by well-know%n statistical distributions. They
can be reduced by repetitions of the same
experiment. The "frequentist", or "classical"
concept ofprobability seemsappropriatehere;
the probability of an event is interpreted as
the limit frequency of the occurrence of that
event in a large number of idenitical repetitions
of the same experiment. This is the concept
of probability that is usually applied in the
design of clinical trials by individual re-
search teams.
In contrast, the uncertainty facing the
clinical-scientific community is much less
easy to define. Any new result by an indi-
vidual research team must be weighed against
the background of previous and current
research; the previous and present results,
may be conflicting, yet they must be evalua-
ted with respect to early applicability in
clinical practice. We propose that the type of
uncertainty faced at this second level of
planning and evaluation is more appropriately
dealt with if it is interpreted subjectively,
and if the Bayesian (or subjective) view of
probability is used as an approach to measur-
ing it. The 'subject" here is the clinical-
scientific community, and the probability of
an event is a quantity which represents the
strength of belief in its occurrence. In this
context, the problem of how rationally to
change previously held beliefs in the light of
newr evidence, which is the problem faced by
the clinical-scientific community, can be
solved by recourse to Bayes's theorem (see
below). Thus, we shall use classical and
Bayesian interpretations simultaneously to
discuss the planning and evaluation ofclinical
trials. The classical approach will be used to
describe the point of view, of the individual
research team and the Bayesian approach
that ofthe clinical-scientific community. This
is not done with any intent to reconcile these
2 differing (and sometimes conflicting)
schools ofthought on probability. Instead, the
intent is only to attempt to take into account
the fact that research does not happen in
isolation. Any particular research group oper-
ates within a clinical-scientific community
which scrutinizes its newt results. Progress is
not achieved until and unless a new result is
accepted by this community and integrated
into its overall scientific "conventional wis-
dom". It is the duty of this community to
react with caution to new claims by individual
research teams; the more extraordinary the
claim, the closer the caution should be to
scepticism. Yet the results of well designed
experiments should, in due course, be able to
change scepticism into acceptance. Merton
(1973) has used the term "principle of organ-
ized skepticism" to describe the need for such
an attitude. A combination of classical and
6193A. CIAMPI AND J. E. TILL
Bayesian probability can be used to describe
explicitly the process of confrontation of a
new result with the "organized skepticism"
of the clinical-scientific community.
The design of the clinical trial
We will consider only the simple case of a
clinical trial which may have only 2 pos-
sible outcomes: "Treatment A is more effec-
tive than Treatment B", or, "Treatments A
and B are equally effective". The former will
be referred to as a positive result, and the
latter as a null result. It is assumed that
the individual research team adheres to the
classical school of probability and, in par-
ticular, to the Neyman-Pearson approach to
hypothesis testing. The experiment is planned
so that the validity of the conclusions to be
drawn is limited primarily by 2 numbers:
a, the probability of a Type I error (also
called the level of significance), and /3, the
probability of a Type II error (1-f is also
referred to as the power ofthe test). The usual
procedure is to test the "null hypothesis" that
the treatments being compared are indis-
tinguishable. Rejection of the null hypo-
thesis permits acceptance of the alternative
hypothesis that the 2 treatments differ.
An essential aspect of the classical approach
is the selection, in advance, of a probability
model involving specified values of ax and /.
A trial design involves not only a and /, but
also specification of the numbers of patients,
NA and NB, to be given Treatments A andB,
based on the expected differences in outcome
between the 2 groups, A and B. There is
little doubt that, from the viewpoint of the
classical school, a properly randomized,
double-blind prospective clinical trial is the
statistically correct way for the research
team to plan a study. Eligible patients are
chosen according to some well-defined criteria,
and are randomly assigned to Treatments A
and B, until the numbers assigned reach the
values NA and NB specified in the design (see
Gehan & Schneiderman, 1973; Freiman et al.,
1978; Feinstein, 1977; Peto et al., 1976,
1977).
In this simple example, the ethical problem
is: "Should we deprive NB patients of the
potentially superior therapy provided by
Treatment A?" This problem is particularly
acute if the only measure of treatment out-
come is duration of survival, as is often the
case in oncology trials. Yet if this ethical
problem is avoided by assigning all patients
to Treatment A, then the results can only be
compared with historical controls. This
creates difficulties that are well known
(Chalmers etal., 1972; Byaretal., 1976;Kemp-
thorne, 1977). However, even a properly
randomized trial is subject to error; its
superiority is merely in the fact that meaning-
ful bounds can be placed on the uncertainty of
the results, using the classical concept of
probability to assess this uncertainty. Thus,
when balanced against the risks to which the
patients involved are subjected, the superi-
ority of randomization is not absolute. The
appropriate question to ask is not "should we
randomize?" but "when is it ethically accept-
able to randomize?"
To develop some guidelines for the resolu-
tion of this dilemma, it is useful to go from
the level of the individual research team to
that of the clinical-scientific community. It
seems unlikely that the experts and leaders of
opinion in the field will be unanimous in their
beliefthat Treatment A is more effective than
B; under these circumstances, the trial would
be unlikely to be undertaken. We suggest
that, at least in principle, the views of the
leaders ofopinion, before the trial is performed,
can be condensed into a number p, between
0 and 1, which provides a measure of the
strength of belief of the clinical-scientific
community. Here p=- represents certainty
that Treatment A is more effective than B
and p=0 represents total disbelief that there
is any meaningful difference between the 2
treatments. We shall regardp as the Bayesian
prior probability of a true treatment differ-
ence. The prior probability of the existence
of no treatment difference is q= 1-p.
Equivalently, the odds ratio p/q can be used
to measure the strength of belief in the
existence of a true differeiice, and its inverse,
qlp, the strength of the opposite belief. The
meaning of the ratio p/q can be expressed in
the language of game theory, as follows: a
"rational gambler" who believes that an
eventhappens with probabilityp, would stake
p/q dollars on its occurrence for every dollar
staked by a hypothetical opponent. For
instance, if p=0-25 is the Bayesian prior
probability that there is a treatment differ-
ence, p/q=0-25/0-75=1/3. At 1/3 odds, we
should stake one dollar on a positive outcome
only ifthe opponent stakes 3 dollars. We will
not consider in any detail how one might
attempt to estimate the probability p, or the
odds p/q. The problem might be approached
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directly, by estimating p; this could be done
quite easily if the question "do you believe
that the trial will yield positive results?"
could be answered by a simple "yes" or no
Then, p would be estimated by the fraction
of experts who give a "yes" answer. Alterna-
tively p might be estimated indirectly by
eliciting from each expert an estimate of the
odds in favour of obtaining positive results;
this approach would permit each expert to
express an opinion in a more quantitative
manner than is possible with a forced choice
between a crude "yes" or "no". In this case,
what would need to be developed would be a
scale for measuring p/q, using well-established
methods of scaling widely used in the social
sciences (cf. Bailey, 1978; Maranell, 1974).
Any such approach to the estimation of p or
p/q would need to be tested adequately for its
feasibility, reliability and validity. We only
wish to suggest that the Bayesian prior prob-
ability is indeed amenable to measurement,
and that it provides a useful way to represent
strength of belief. However, its estimation is
not a trivial problem, and a more comprehen-
sive discussion of measurement methods is
outside the scope of this paper (see Gilbert
et al., 1977; Fhaner, 1977; Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1974 for some interesting views and
applications).
In the absence of a method for measuring
p, we can only speculate about the kind of
results such a measurement might provide.
Perhaps a rough estimate ofthe average value
for p, based on current experience in clinical
trials, can be provided by the suggestion that
"nowadays, for every trial that compares 2
treatments which are substantially different,
there are probably 5 to 10 'null' trials in
progress comparing treatments which are
equally effective" (Peto et al., 1976). This
implies that a value between 0a1 and 0-2
probably represents a minimum average
estimate of p. It may be an underestimate,
since current experience may reflect not only
trade-offs between ethics and scientific rigor,
but also other factors, such as a paucity of
new treatments of substantially increased
effectiveness. Also, expert opinion may, for a
variety of reasons, tend to overestimate the
subjective evaluation of p, relative to what
may have been a more realistic value on the
basis of subsequent information.
If a reliable and valid method for the esti-
mation of p could be developed, how might
the results be used in the design of a clinical
trial? Two aspects of the estimate of p are
important: its magnitude, and its variance.
If the variance, which measures the diversity
of expert opinion on the value ofp, is large,
then it may be difficult to arrive at any con-
sensus about how such information should be
used. If, however, the variance is not large,
then the magnitude of the point estimate
becomes ofinterest. Ifthe prior probability is
too high, a randomized trial is likely to suffer
from the unwillingness ofpatients to enter the
trial, or of their physicians to permit entry,
because of concern about the patients being
denied a therapy that is believed, with a high
prior probability, to be superior. On the other
hand, trials based on a low prior probability
are almost certain to produce null results. It
must be recognized that the choice of an
"appropriate" p depends on the answer to the
question "appropriate to whom?" Different
groups, whether they be composed of indi-
viduals primarily concerned with scientific
rigor or individuals primarily concerned with
ethics, will be very likely to give a different
answer to this question. Several conflicting
value systems may be involved. "High p"
groups would favour scientific rigor,andwould
be more willing to accept a risk that some
patients in the trial might be denied the
potentially superior therapy. "Lowp" groups
would favour the ethical aspect, and would
be more averse to accepting such a risk. The
higher the value of p that is considered an
acceptable basis for a trial, the higher the
priority that is given to years of life saved for
other patients at some time in the future, in
comparison with years of life saved for the
patients entering the current trial. In the
language ofcost-effectiveness evaluations, the
higher the value of p considered acceptable,
the lower the discount rate applied to future
years of life saved (Weinstein & Stason 1977;
Pliskin & Taylor, 1977).
For the purposes ofthis paper, we shall use
the estimate of p based on current practice
as the basis for a minimum norm, and suggest
that an appropriate p should not exceed 0-2.
In making this suggestion, we recognize that
we have chosen to accept a "low p" value
system, and have done so deliberately, in
order to illustrate some implications of this
value system for clinical trials. This is not
meant to imply that "high p" groups are
necessarily callous about the acceptance of
risks for patients receiving inferior treatment,
since, as pointed out above, expert opinion
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may tend to yield systematic overestimates
of the subjective evaluation ofp. This possi-
bility merits investigation.
Our argument may be summarized as
follows:
For ethical reasons, the trial is unlikely to
be attempted ifp is judged to be large, within
the framework of the value system of the
group responsible for making the decision to
proceed with the trial. Ordinarily, expert
opinion about the estimated value of p for
the trial will be correct, and a low p will lead
to frequent null results. Fortunately, the
expert opinion will sometimes be wrong, and
a positive result will be obtained even in the
face of a subjectively assessed low prior
probability. The situation is similar to any
other betting context; it would be foolish
always to place bets in favour of positive
results when the odds against them are large,
yet occasional wins at such long odds do occur
(and make the gambler's fortune!). For
randomized clinical trials, the odds do not
favour positive results. for ethical reasons,
and we can only hope for occasional strokes
of luck which will permit dramatic progress
to be made.
The results ofa clinical trial
When a trial is completed, the individual
research team draws conclusions on the basis
of the pre-selected probabilities of Type I
error (o) and Type II error (/), according to
the well-known Neyman-Pearson decision
rules. In the simple case under consideration
here, there are only 2 possible conclusions:
positive results (R) and null results (NR).
These conclusions may or may not be in
agreement with the actual situation, which
can be either a true treatment difference (D),
or no trut treatment difference (ND). The
weight of the evidence on which the con-
clusions are based can be summarized by a
quantity known to statisticians as the likeli-
hood ratio (r). In the case of a positive result,
this ratio is:
r(R)= (1)
The numerator of this ratio is the power of
the test (1-/3), which corresponds to the
probability of obtaining a "true positive"
result, i.e. of concluding that there is a
difference (Event R) when the treatments do
in fact differ (Event D). The denominator is
the level of significance, (ax), which is the
probability of a "false positive" result, i.e.
ofconcluding that there is a difference (Event
R) when the treatments do not in fact differ
(Event ND).
For the case of a null result, the corres-
ponding likelihood ratio is:
r(NR) =3 (2)
where the ratio is the probability of a "true
null" result, divided by the probability of a
"false null" result. Thus, in both cases, r is the
ratio of the probability of drawing a correct
conclusion to the probability of drawing an
incorrect one. A large value for both r(R) and
r(NR) is desirable, and is ensured by choosing
small values for both a and /. It should be
emphasized, however, that withinthe classical
interpretation of probability, one cannot
relate these values for r to the belief of the
researchers in their own results. Instead, r is
an a priori quantity entirely determined by
the choice of experimental design.
At the level of the clinical-scientific com-
munity, however, these same results obtained
by an individual research team will be
evaluated in a context which will be biased
against the occurrence of Event D (a true
treatment difference). This bias should exist
for the reasons discussed above: the principle
of organized scepticism, and the trade-off
between ethics and scientific rigor. We have
proposed that the bias can be estimated using
the Bayesian prior probability p, or prior
odds, p/q. The degree to which this initial
belief is changed after consideration of the
conclusions from aparticularnewly-completed
trial will depend on the weight of the
evidence, together with the strength of the
initial belief, and can be assessed quantita-
tively using Bayes' theorem. For the simple
case of 2 possible outcomes, Bayes' theorem
can be expressed as:
Posterior odds=r (prior odds) (3)
where r is the likelihood ratio, from Equation
(1) or Equation (2). That is, if the trial yields
a positive result, the posterior odds in favour
of the positive result are given by:
Posterior oddsp= ) ( (4)
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Ifa null conclusion is reached, the posterior
odds in favour of a null result are:
Posterior oddsN= ( ) (p) (5)
Thus the evidence, as expressed by the
likelihood ratio, acts on the prior odds to
change them by a multiplicative factor r (see
also Lee, 1971).
A more detailed discussion of Equation (3)
is given in the Appendix. It should be noted
that this equation describes an ideal situation,
in which the change in opinion takes place in a
rational manner, and no bias other than the
one represented by the prior odds is present.
Typical values of ox and / are 0 05 and 0-2
(Gehan & Schneiderman, 1973) although the
value of : actually achieved is often not as
small at this (Freiman et al., 1978). As dis-
cussed above, a value ofp =0-2 may represent
a minimum average estimate based on current
experience. Forthese values oftheparameters,
we obtain:
r (R)=16, r (NR)=4-75, p/q=025, q/p=4,
-cz
&40
and the posterior odds, given that a positive
result has occurred. are 4: 1. The correspond-
ing posterior odds, given that a null result has
occurred, are 19:1. Expressed in terms of
probabilities rather than odds, a positive
result would change the probability of a true
treatment difference from 0-2 (prior) to 0-8
(posterior), while a null result would change
the probability of no true treatment differ-
ence from 0-8 (prior) to 0 95 (posterior). If we
define the impact of a result by the strength
ofthe belief with which they are accepted, as
measured by the magnitude of the posterior
probability or the posterior odds (rather than
by the change in probability caused by the
result) then a null result has a greater impact
in this case than a positive result. Although
positive results do change disbelief (odds less
than unity) into belief, the degree of accept-
ance is lower than that given to null results.
This consequence holds also for other common
designs and is insensitive to small variations
in of, : and p, as illustrated by the curves
shown in Fig. 1. These curves represent
p
FIGTPIRE. Dependence of the posterior probability of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a new treat-
ment, expressed as the posterior odds, as a function of the prior probability p. For further explana-
t.ion, see text, and Equations (4), (5) an(d (6).
Examples
0-01
0-05
0-05
() 1
f r(R)
0 05 95 00
0 10 18-00
0-20 16-00
0(50 5 00
r(NR)
19-80
9 50
4-75
18(0
Po
0 31
0-42
0-35
0-38
623624 A. CIAMPI AND J. E. TILL
posterior odds, rather than posterior proba-
bilities, as a function of the priorprobability
of a true treatment difference. As mentioned
above, both probabilities and odds are
measures of belief; choice of the latter
measure of impact enhances differences
between large probabilities, but does not
change the argument qualitatively.
The pair of curves representing the pos-
terior odds, given that a positive or a null
result was obtained, intersect at th-e point
po
= I/(I +-,vlr(R)lr(NR)) (6)
This is also the point of intersection of the
corresponding probability curves.
For all values ofp less thanpo, we find that
positive results have less impact, as defined
above, than null results. Values for po for
the curves in thefigure aregiven in its legend,
for values ofp ofabout 0-4 or less, null results
will have greater impact than positive ones.
As discussed earlier, a randomized trial is
probablyinappropriate ifp exceeds 0-2 on the
basis of current experience. Thus, null results
would usually be expected to have a greater
impact; if a positive result is obtained, its
relatively.low credibility could tend to slow
down its use in clinical practice. Indeed, more
experimentation might be necessary to reach
the point where the opinion of the clinical-
scientific community would be reversed. But
at this point, a randomized clinical trial may
have ceased to be ethical. The absence of the
confirmatory scientifically rigorous evidence
such an additional trial might provide could
result in a continuin-u delav ofacceptance of a
new therapy.
This reasoning leads to the prediction that
positive results would beexpected to have less
impact on the clinical-scientific community
than null results. It is, however, based on the
assumption that the clinical-scientific com-
munity will make use of new results in a
Ccrational" manner, according to Bayes'
theorem. Whether this is the case is certainly
open to question, and needs to be tested
experimentally (Lee, 1971; Lyon & Slovic,
1975). In practice, it is very likely that posi-
tive results from a well organized clinical trial
will have more impact on the clinical-
scientific community than would bepredicted
from Bayes' theorem, primarily because of
the strong pressure of the need to improve
treatments. Such pressure can, for example,
lead to the early publication of positive
results, while null results may often not be
published at all (Peto etal., 1976). Theneglect
of prior probabilities that is fostered by this
pressure can lead to a recurring situation of
false hope follo-vA,ed by disillusionment; an
initial enthusiasm for a positive result is
replaced bydisappointment when subsequent
results are lessimpressive.
THE NEED FOR NEW APPROACHES
This analysis reveals some intrinsic
limitations ofthe clinical-trial mechanism,
limitations which tend to frustrate its
basic aims. The analysis hinges on 2
aspects. One is the ethical need to plan
therapeutic trials with small prior prob-
abilities of success: as a consequence, most
results arenull, in accordwithexpectation.
The other is the scientific need to evaluate
new results in a manner which takes into
account prior probabilities. If prior prob-
abilities are considered, according to
Bayes' theorem, null results have a much
greater impact than positive ones. If, on
the other hand, the clinical-scientific
community, under the pressure of the
need for more effective treatments, dis-
regards prior probabilities and the prin-
ciple of organized scepticism, the conse-
quence is a tendency to encourage false
hopes.
Is it possible to improve the system
without violating ethical constraints or
discouraging innovation? The answer is
clearlynegative aslong as success isdefined
exclusively in terms of cure. We propose
that the key to a substantial improve-
ment is to broaden the definition of success
in a meaningful way. In order to do this,
it is necessary to be aware of the different
sets of values which are at work in the
health-care system, and to include con-
siderations ofthese values in the planning
of clinical trials. A careful consideration
of values should make it easier to reach
some consensus on what should be con-
sidered "success", either by explicitly
using a particular value system, or by
reaching an "optimal compromise" be-
tween different value systems.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss in detail the different valueNULL RESULTS IN CLINICAL TRIALS
systems at work in health care, but our
discussion would be incomplete without a
tentative outline. We shall attempt to
develop a preliminary approach to value
analysis. Although this approach is not
novel in other fields, where systems
analysis has been applied extensively
(World Health Organization, 1976;
Laszlo, 1972; Churchman, 1968) its rele-
vance to clinical trials has received little
attention.
Efforts to improve health may be con-
sidered to involve at least 5 broad inter-
acting dimensions:
(a) improvements in understanding patho-
logical processes and the action of
therapeutic agents ("explanatory"
dimension);
(b) improvements in eliminating disease
and extending life ("cure" dimension);
(c) improvements in reducing the disrup-
tive and painful effects of diseases
("care" dimension);
(d) improvements in controlling diseases
and promoting health at the popula-
tion level ("prevention" dimension);
(e) improvements in socio-economic effici-
ency ("cost" dimension).
A value system could be regarded as a
set of "relative weights" for these dimen-
sions.
Success ofan attempt to improve health
should be defined in terms ofeach ofthese
dimensions. We shall omit the "preven-
tion" dimension from the following dis-
cussion because we are concerned with the
typical oncology trial, which does not
involve large populations. The remaining
dimensions, however, are all directly in-
volved in a clinical trial and its potential
impact on each of them should be
analysed when the trial is being designed.
The impact of a clinical trial on the
explanatory dimension can only be meas-
ured in terms of variables which are
appropriate to the particular biological
model under investigation (e.g. measure-
ments at the molecular, cellular, tissue or
system level). Such measurements can
often be performed on biopsy or blood
samples with little or no additional risk
for the patients, and can provide import-
ant information about the natural history
of the disease, or the effects of treatment.
The successful acquisition of such infor-
mation need not be dependent on im-
provements in other dimensions. A trial
designed to shed further light on a bio-
logical problem was termed "explanatory"
by Schwartz & Lellouch (1967). Their
distinction between "explanatory" and
"pragmatic" trials is useftil in that it
serves to emphasise the importance of
making the appropriate distinctions at
the planning stage of a trial. An examina-
tion of the remaining dimensions will
allow us to distinguish different "prag-
matic" aims.
For appraising improvements affecting
the cure dimension, the duration of sur-
vival or the time to recurrence of disease
are appropriate outcome variables. Sur-
vival time has been used increasingly as
the response criterion for therapeutic
trials in oncology (Bardelli & Saracci,
1978) and not surprisingly the language
and the methodology to describe and
study survival curves are well developed.
Thus, in a sense, the cure-orientated value
system has been the predominant one in
such trials. WVe suggest that trials based
entirely on the cure dimension are ex-
tremely difficult to plan with a high prior
probability of success. The emphasis on
survival data should therefore be balanced
by proper attention to other variables.
Appropriate variables for the care
dimension are those that measure short-
term efficacy of a treatment. Thus, an
improvement in care could be defined in
terms of reduced side effects, amelioration
of symptoms, and restoration of physical
or psycho-social function. Measures of
"quality of life" have often been dis-
cussed, but are seldom used (Bardelli &
Saracci, 1978). The development ofinstru-
ments such as those used to obtain health-
status indices (Sackett & Torrance, 1978;
Culyer, 1978; Kaplan et al., 1976) may
provide a useful approach to the assess-
ment of such short-term variables.
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Finally, variables of interest for the
"cost" dimension would involve various
types of cost (direct and indirect costs to
the patient, to the health agencies, to
society, etc.). By combining effectiveness
and cost measures, comparisons ofalterna-
tive approaches to health delivery could
be performed. The techniques of cost-
effectiveness analysis are still under de-
velopment (Weinstein & Stason, 1977;
Pliskin & Taylor, 1977) and, of course, are
subject to the combined uncertainties of
those involved in the assessment both of
effectiveness and of cost.
A value analysis of the type outlined
could help in the planning of clinical
trials. While success along the cure
dimension may remain unlikely, appro-
priate planning could select one or more of
the other dimensions (depending on the
value systems involved) about which an
important question could be asked. It is
difficult to imagine a trial which would
have low prior probability ofsuccess along
all the dimensions outlined above; a basic
aim of the value analysis approach out-
lined above is to design clinical trials so
that null results along all the dimensions
selected would be rare.
An example: adult acute myeloid leukaernia
(AML)
A single example will be considered
briefly in order to illustrate some of the
points outlined in the previous section.
The basis for the example is a trial on the
chemotherapy of AML in adults (Medical
Research Council, 1979). The clinical
expertise involved in this trial was out-
standing, as was the care taken in defining
and following the protocol, and the
thoroughness of the statistical analysis.
The trial is chosen as representative ofthe
clinical-trials mechanism, not in order to
subject it to criticism but to use it to
illustrate how a value analysis at the
planning level might be helpful in obtain-
ing additional information from such
trials.
The purpose of this particular trial was
to compare 2 regimens of multiple-drug
chemotherapy, to see whether the extra
toxicity expected from the more intensive
regimen (TRAP) would be compensated
for by higher remission rates and better
survival. The overall results showed no
significant difference between the 2
regimens in remission rate or duration of
survival, although improvement in sur-
vival associated with more intensive
chemotherapy was substantial forpatients
who had favourable prognostic features
at presentation. From the viewpoint of
value analysis, several points of interest
about this trial become apparent:
(a) Explanatory dimension.-The ration-
ale behind the uise of more intensive
therapy was that chemotherapy induces
remission by killing leukaemic cells, and
more intensive therapy should leave fewer
surviving cells. A direct test of this
rationale would require studies at the
cellular level, designed to assess the effects
of chemotherapeutic agents on the rele-
vant cell populations. A provocative
alternative view is that chemotherapeutic
agents act at least in part by stimulating
the differentiation of cells belonging to the
leukaemic cell population (Sachs, 1978).
Measurements at the cellular level designed
to assess the explanatory dimension were
not included in the MRC' trial. However,
cell-culture methodology for assessing
sensitivity to chemotherapeutic agents is
becoming available for leukaemic cells
with proliferative potential (Buick et al.,
1979; Dicke et al., 1976) and for clono-
genic cells from solid tumours (Salmon
et al., 1978). A value system which gave
major weight to the explanatory dimen-
sion would lead to the incorporation of
studies at the cellular level into the design
of a trial.
(b) Cutre dinmension.-This dimension
received major emphasis in the design of
the MRC trial, since the aim of the trial
was to test whether or not more intensive
therapy would improve remission fre-
quency, duration ofremission, or survival.
The prior probability of a positive result is
difficult to assess in retrospect, but was
probably not unusually low; indeed, more
626NULL RESULTS IN CLINICAL TRIALS
intensive remission-induction therapy had
already been reported to give high re-
mission rates (see, e.g., Gale & Cline,
1977). However, a null result was ob-
tained in the MRC trial, in that the overall
results showed no significant difference
between the 2 protocols in remission
rate or in duration of survival, although
patients randomized to the more intensive
regimen fared slightly better (P=0.06).
However, retrospective stratification of
the groups into categories of patients
differing in important prognostic factors
(such as age) indicated a superiority ofthe
more intensive regimen for patients with
favourable prognostic features. It is note-
worthy that the results for neither of the
regimens used in the MRC trial were as
good as in the original reports (MRC,
1979). If Bayes' theorem were used to
take these new results into account, they
would be expected to have considerable
impact, and might arouse scepticism about
the probability ofsuccess ofmore intensive
remission-induction therapy (see also
Curtis etal., 1979). However, it seems more
likely that the null result to the question
actually asked, on a prospective basis, in
the trial ("Does more intensive therapy
give better overall results?") will receive
less weight in the clinical-scientific com-
munity than the question asked on a
retrospective basis ("Do different cate-
gories of patients respond differently to
more intensive therapy?").
(c) Care and cost dimen8ions.-The care
and cost dimensions were not explicitly
taken into account in the design of the
trial, except to add specialized care for
patients receiving more aggressive
therapy. Yet in the report these dimen-
sions are mentioned because they are
important for a proper interpretation of
the results. To quote the authors: "for
the poor risk groups it seems likely that
improvement in supportive care during
remission induction therapy would reduce
the risk of early death . . . but while sup-
portive care is inadequate, more intensive
therapy offers no advantage and its use is
difficult to justify because of the extra
43
toxicity, extra cost and the high incidence
ofside effects."
The above remarks would have a much
greater practical weight if they could be
supported by appropriate measurements
of "toxicity", "side effects" and "cost".
Ofcourse, these measurements would need
to be considered at the design stage; the
relevant measurement techniques are still
under development, as mentioned pre-
viously.
We conclude from this example ofvalue
analysis that consideration ofthe different
dimensions involved in health care is
feasible in the context of realistic clinical
trials. It does not seem unreasonable to
suggest that greater attention be paid to
these dimensions in the design of future
trials. Even though major attention will
undoubtedly continue to be paid to the
cure dimension, the incorporation into
trials of measurements designed to answer
explicit questions about other dimensions
shouldgreatly enhance the value or impact
of such trials, even if the answers to the
question based on the cure dimension turn
out to be null.
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APPENDIX
In a comparison of treatments in a clinical
trial, 4 events are of interest; they are rep-
resented by the symbols R, NR, D and ND:
Yes No
A difference is reported
A true difference exists
R NR
D ND
Before the clinical trial, the prior proba-
bility (as a measure of belief) that D is the
case is:
P(D)=p (Al)
Also:
P(ND)=1-p=q (A2)
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The design of the trial involves 4 proba-
bilities:
P(R/D) =1-f (A3)
P(NR/D)=f (A4)
P(R/ND) = a (A5)
P(NR/ND) = 1-a (A6)
For instance, P(R/D), the probability of
R given D, is the probability of correctly
concluding that a difference exists. It is given
by an underlying probability model and can
be identified with 1-fl, as in equation A3,
where / is the probability of missing a true
difference (type II error).
After the experiment, either event R or
event NR occurs. If R is the case, then the
posterior probability (again a measure of
belief) is, by the definition of conditional
probability
P(RD) P(RD) P(D) P(R) = P(D) P(R)
=P(R/D) . P(D) (A7) P(R)
On the other hand,
P(R)=P(R/D) . P(D)+P(R/ND) . P(ND)
=p . P(R/D)+q . P(R/ND) (A8)
Substitution in (A7) yields:
P(D/R)= P(R/D)+q . P(R/ND) (A9)
If the NR is the case, an analogous argu-
ment leads to:
P(ND/NR)- q. P(NR/ND) ~~'q..P(NR/ND)+p.P(NR/D)
(AIO)
Equations A9 and AIO are the usual formula-
tion ofBayes' theorem, applied tothe 4 events
of interest in a clinical trial. P(D/R) and
P(ND/NR) are the posterior probabilities
that the true situation coincides with what is
reported for the 2 possible events R and NR,
i.e., the posterior probabilities that a true
positive or a true null result are obtained.
Also:
P(ND/R) = 1-P(D/R) (A1)
P(D/NR)=1-P(ND/NR) (A12)
From (A9), (AlO), (All) and (A12):
P(D/R) p.P(R/D) (A13)
P(ND/R) -q P(R/ND)
P(ND/NR) q -P(NR/ND) (A14)
P(D/NR) - p. P(NR/D)
Define:
Posterior oddsp =P(D/R)/P(ND/R) (A15)
Posterior oddsN =P(ND/NR)/P(D/NR)
(A16)
Prior oddsp =p/q (A17)
Prior oddsN =qlp (A18)
r(R)=P(R/D)/P(R/ND) (A19)
=(1- 3)/oc, from (A3) and (A5)
r(NR)=P(NR/ND)/P(NR/D) (A20)
=(l-o)/,B, from (A4) and (A6)
Then, from (A13) and A14):
Posterior oddsp =r(R). Prior oddsp (A21)
Posterior oddsN =r(NR). Prior oddsN
(A22)
Or, in condensed form:
Posterior odds =r. Priorodds (A23)
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